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Reforming the Fed:  What Would Real Change Look Like? 
 
Proposals to reform the Federal Reserve in one manner or another now have been put 
forward by Christopher Dodd in the Senate and Ron Paul and Barney Frank in the House of 
Representatives.  Elements of the various bills address the role of the Fed in bank supervision 
and regulation, potential conflicts of interest between the Fed’s responsibilities as a regulator 
and the method by which regional bank presidents are appointed, and the introduction of a 
GAO audit of Fed activities.  Predictably, academic economists, some of whom have served on 
the Board of Governors or in other capacities as Fed officials, have argued that the proposed 
reforms threaten the Fed’s independence and, in central banking circles, less independence 
necessarily implies an impediment to achieving the goals of monetary policy.  Others have 
objected to one proposal or another for reasons unrelated to the default argument of protecting 
the Fed’s independence; for example, there are valid economic arguments to retain the Fed as a 
bank regulator irrespective of the Fed’s independence as an institution.  As with most 
discussions in Washington, strands of good ideas can be found in each of the proposals that 
have been offered.  There is also much in each of the proposals that is ill-advised.  The trick, of 
course, is to separate one from the other.  
 This is not to say that the Fed cannot be improved by reform.  After all, it is an 
institution that stands, in 2009, with few changes from the structure that Congress established 
in 1913: A seven member Board of Governors seated in Washington, DC, appointed by the 
President and confirmed by the Senate and twelve regional banks, chartered as private 
corporations, headed by presidents appointed by local boards of directors.  This System had 
then, and has now, responsibilities for monetary policy, bank supervision and regulation and 
the provision of certain services in the payments system; until the early 1980s, those services 
were provided free of charge but, with deregulation in 1982, the Fed was required to begin 
charging fees for them and, with competition from private sector vendors, service volume fell 
and consolidation of Fed activities among fewer branch offices occurred.  Bizarrely, however, in 
instances where priced services operations have been consolidated at one branch office and 
ceased at another, the Fed still maintains Boards of Directors at those branch offices where 
business no longer is conducted (more on that below). 
 With three broad functional responsibilities and a world that has changed dramatically 
in the last ninety-five years, a reasonable person might ask whether the Fed is ready for a 
makeover.  The answer is that the makeover is long overdue but politicians and economists 
alike seem too blinded by distractions to think about changes that go beyond superficial 
“reforms.”  For politicians, their interests are parochial and in the same spirit of questions 
about military base closings in home districts:  If it’s in my district, it’s an essential function.  
For economists, the issue of central bank independence has been linked so closely to central 
bank performance that anything seen as a potential threat to is attacked as a threat to the 
institution.  Operating under the burden of these blinders, few have bothered to ask a question 
we might pose to students:  Starting from scratch, what would the Fed look like if it were being 
created today?  Having outlined the Fed’s three major responsibilities earlier, let’s begin with 
the basics. 
 First and foremost, the Federal Reserve is the institution responsible for the conduct of 
monetary policy.  While this should be obvious, it apparently is not obvious that the Fed is not 
the institution that is responsible for American agriculture, social security, education, energy, 
and any in the endless list of research topics investigated by Federal Reserve economists.  
When A T & T was a regulated monopoly, it had the luxury of subsidizing the pure research 
conducted at Bell Labs and doing nice things such as distributing the Bell Journal of 
Economics for free.  But the Fed is supported by taxpayers and it has a responsibility to 
taxpayers to follow its mandate.  I have no memory of the Department of Education holding 
conferences on the status of monetary policy or the Secretary of Energy being asked to testify 
on matters pertaining to the money supply.  The Fed’s responsibility is monetary policy, not to 
serve as “Mr. Know it All.” 
 The role of the regional banks within the policymaking process also has been lost over 
time.  According to press releases, the Fed’s policymaking body, the Federal Open Market 
Committee (FOMC), is a “deliberative” body.  Superficially, this would lead an observer to 
believe that the twelve regional banks would produce research arguing alternative points of 
view about, for example, the merits of interest rate targeting as a strategy for the 
implementation of monetary policy in practice.  Moreover, when Chairman Greenspan hijacked 
monetary policy in the late 1980s and early 1990s from the FOMC – allowing the Committee to 
vote for “no change” in the funds rate on a Tuesday but then used a change in the discount 
rate on a Friday with a “pass-through” change in the funds rate for “technical reasons” – you 
would think that a review of the record would show outrage by bank presidents and Governors 
alike at this outrageous abuse of the Chairman’s power.  Of course, why would you call the 
Chairman on this while, over the same period of time he was almost certainly the person who 
was leaking FOMC decisions to the Wall St. Journal. 1   A review of the record at the twelve 
regional Reserve Banks, however, will show (a) very little research critical of official monetary 
policy positions (b) increasing amounts of research devoted to theoretical abstractions 
unrelated to applied policy questions (c) complete silence on abuse of the policy process (and 
this is but one example).  Any concerned taxpayer can be forgiven for asking: Why am I paying 
for Potemkin Village?  Or, if we need a village, do we need one with twelve regional banks to 
create a “deliberative body?” 
 The situation has not been helped in Washington by the newest Yuppie affectation, 
which is the tendency to use an appointment to the Board of Governors as just-another-line-
on-my-bio.  If any institution defines the concept of “Byzantine,” it is the structure and politics 
of the Board of Governors, something about which, for example, former Vice Chairman Alan 
Blinder has written. 2  The staff run the show, the staff have all of the institutional memory and 
the staff are beholden to the Chairman in the tasks they conduct.  If you think you are going to 
cruise into town and get any answer to any question and have the staff at your disposal when 
the Chairman prefers instead that you remain the dark and operate without support, join 
Inspector Clouseau in the Surete’ because you are in the wrong place.  The reality is that, 
during your two-year tour of duty, you will be treated like a Bernie Madoff investor:   You’ll be 
given the illusion that you’re important, the illusion that you know what’s going on and, all the 
while, the Chairman and the staff will conduct the Fed’s business exactly as they please.  Of 
course, the exceptionally gifted also may be aware of what is happening but will agree to the 
duplicity in exchange for the consulting fees and other post-Fed perks that come with the deal.  
But how the public interest is served by this revolving door on Constitution Avenue has yet to 
be explained.  The Fed is not the Supreme Court but the public never would tolerate the same 
casual treatment to appointments to this institution. 
 In the area of bank supervision and regulation, Chairmen going back to Paul Volcker 
have argued that, with the Fed’s primary focus being on the safety and soundness of the 
payments system, its supervisory responsibilities could be confined to the one hundred largest 
bank holding companies.  With some of the largest investment banks converting to bank 
holding companies to find shelter (and taxpayer welfare) during recent events, this standard 
would give the Fed the foothold it needs to prevent systemic problems while leaving oversight of 
smaller banks to other regulatory bodies.  If reformers agree that the Fed’s regulatory function 
need only extend to those institutions that have implications for the payments system, the Fed 
does not need twelve regional offices to execute its supervisory responsibilities. 
 Finally, the evidence already is in on the priced services function:  Competition has 
taken away a substantial piece of the Fed’s business and branch offices have been 
consolidated.  The St. Louis district, for example, once had fully-functioning branches in Little 
Rock, Louisville and Memphis.  The first two, however, no longer carry out any operations 
(Little Rock services now are done at Memphis and the Louisville operations have been shifted 
to the Cincinnati branch of the Cleveland Fed).  Still, all three branches remain open with 
boards of directors to oversee their functioning!  But what do they do?  Clues are provided by 
the St. Louis Fed’s website:  The Little Rock Branch of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis serves 
the western two-thirds of Arkansas with initiatives in community development, economic education, 
research and monetary policy…….the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis has a mandate to increase its 
community involvement and intellectual presence in each of its Branch cities. Leading the Little Rock 
Branch's community outreach efforts are Senior Branch Executive Robert Hopkins and a board of 
directors representing a wide spectrum of the region's economy.  Sorry, but you’re not ACORN or the 
Chamber of Commerce or anything else. 3  You’re the central bank with responsibilities for 
monetary policy and bank supervision and regulation and the provision of priced services.  Full 
stop. 
 Once you get past the smell test, discerning why these branch offices remain open with 
boards of directors to represent “a wide spectrum of the region’s economy” is not a difficult 
task.  These offices are the Fed’s lobbying arm, ready to be mobilized if and when anyone ever 
tries to tamper with the Fed’s current structure, budget, or power.  Make a serious suggestion 
to reform the Fed in a material way and you have a few hundred well-connected people on 
speed-dial, spread across most, if not all 435 Congressional districts, ready to explain why the 
proposed reform will mean the end of Western civilization……or that member’s Congressional 
career……whichever comes first.  That these branches have not died reveals both the Fed’s 
political game and a complete lack of accountability for its spending. 
Shrinkage and Accountability 
 The reforms proposed below are a bit more dramatic that those that have been offered 
in Washington and they certainly are subject to their own criticisms.  Sen. Dodd believes his 
proposal will pull the Fed back from “mission creep.”  He seems to forget, of course, that it has 
been the Congress that, repeatedly, has tried to get the Fed involved in rescues of non-bank 
commercial firms (e.g., steel, Chrysler and, um, AIG), not to mention efforts to abandon its 
mission of price stability to pursue a weaker dollar in an effort to help agricultural exports.  It 
is precisely this kind of constant harping from Congress that has added, not reduced, “mission 
creep” and Congress has been the problem, not the solution, on this score.  Congressman Paul 
would like the GAO to audit the Fed but the Congress already has oversight powers with 
respect to Fed data.  For reasons unknown, however, Congress has chosen to not to demand 
that the Fed simply comply with mandates of established law.  With this behavior as precedent, 
it’s hard to see how a new audit would change much of anything.  Finally, Congressman Frank 
would like to alter the manner in which the Presidents of the regional Reserve Banks are 
appointed; I have no quibble in principle but in the substance of what he proposes. 
Whether the proposed changes outlined below would achieve a greater coherence 
between the Fed’s mission and the Fed’s behavior is unclear because, ultimately, the results 
depend on people; this, however, is a weakness of all reforms that might be made.  Much as it 
is the case in university settings, rules can be established for certain behaviors with hope left 
that people will respond to incentives and “do the right thing,” but, ultimately, we are human 
and subject to baser instincts that we wish were not part of the human condition.  And, after 
all, we are talking about a political institution.  So, while subject to their own shortcomings, 
the proposed reforms are intended to (a) make the Fed more accountable to the public (b) give 
the responsible people greater incentives to participate in their assigned activities and (c) define 
the Fed’s goals more clearly. 
The first recommendation is to reduce the number of districts in the Federal Reserve 
System from twelve to five and to have the presidents of those five banks nominated by the 
President and confirmed by the Senate just as members of the Board of Governors are.  The 
FOMC still would be composed of twelve members but, in this configuration, the five regional 
bank presidents would have permanent voting privileges.  Based on the shifts in population 
and banking that have occurred since the Fed’s creation, the five main offices would be located 
in New York, Atlanta, Chicago, Dallas and San Francisco.  Some of the locations that currently 
house main offices could be retained as branch locations for priced services operations or 
locations for bank examination staff.  For those who would resist making regional bank 
presidents Presidential appointments subject to Senate confirmation on the grounds that the 
regional banks are chartered as private corporations, be careful:  I believe an examination of 
files will reveal some districts have walked both sides of this street, signing documents for 
building projects as if the regional Fed bank were a federal agency, a nice loophole that 
exempted it from certain building requirements, kept costs (and overhead) down during 
renovations and helped gain an (unfair if not illegal) advantage in the competition for priced 
services business.  That is, unless I am misinformed, some districts already have admitted that 
their chief executive is head of a federal agency and the heads of federal agencies are rightly 
appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. 
The Washington Post has argued that the appointment of regional bank presidents by 
the President, with confirmation by the Senate, would politicize the institution.  The author of 
this piece, like so many others, has forgotten that Paul Volcker vetoed nominations by two 
regional boards of directors (Atlanta and St. Louis) for new bank presidents and, in the latter 
case, put in place his own candidate as a solution to the problem of having an independent 
voice on monetary policy from one research department in the System.  While some may have 
argued that Volcker didn’t want monetarists to be presidents of regional banks, another view is 
that he didn’t want vertebrates to be in those positions.  In any case, the very real potential 
and ample historical precedent for this kind of mischief under both Arthur Burns and Volcker 
is a compelling reason to leave the appointment of regional bank presidents to an authority 
outside the Federal Reserve System. 
 Beyond saving taxpayers a fair piece of change, this shrinkage to a smaller number of 
districts can be justified on grounds described earlier.  Beyond these reasons – declining priced 
service volume and limiting the Fed’s role in bank regulation to the one hundred largest bank 
holding companies – there are justifications within the monetary policy process as well. First, 
given the homogeneity of research and opinion within the System and the substantial 
allocation of resources to activities beyond the scope of the Fed’s mandate, it is difficult to 
justify the existence of twelve research departments – some of them separated by a few 
hundred miles (Kansas City and St. Louis; Boston, New York, Philadelphia and Richmond) – all 
doing and saying virtually the same thing.  The duplication of effort is magnified by the 
devotion of considerable research activity to topics having nothing to do with monetary policy.  
With some presidents having a vote on the FOMC once every three years and their research 
departments largely duplicating the work of the others, fewer voices with stronger incentives to 
make a contribution has some chance of improving the policy process. 
 With respect to the Board of Governors, a way has to found to identify people who are 
willing to treat the position as something more than “what I did on my summer vacation.”  For 
those of an advanced age or knowledge of Fed history, Henry Wallich comes to mind as an 
example of a Fed Governor who served the institution with distinction. Although it may be a 
romantic notion, with longer terms of service Governors would have a better chance of 
acquiring the institutional knowledge that would equip them to serve more knowledgably as 
full participants in the policy process. It’s not clear how this can this can be made to work in 
practice other than by contracts with substantial penalties for non-performance or better 
screening of potential appointees but this is a goal worthy of further scrutiny. 
If incentives can be found that will make individuals commit to the Board of Governors 
for longer terms of service, their own independence needs to be supported with independent 
staff they can select.  This would overcome some of trouble now faced when Governors have to 
rely on Board staff who are controlled by the Chairman.   If, however, the Governors (and 
district bank presidents) are going to continue to be marginalized because they are short-
timers who are overwhelmed by the Chairman’s power and the staff’s institutional memory and 
knowledge, it may be time to consider moving to a System in which we truly have, in form, 
what we have had in practice:  A single person – The Chairman -- who is responsible for 
monetary policy issues and is supported by a staff and a group of consultants. 
 Mission 
 With twelve permanent members of the FOMC responsible for achieving a monetary 
policy outcome, it is reasonable to ask whether the Fed’s current mandate makes sense.  After 
a moment’s thought, it is easy to answer that it does not.  The reason for the quick answer is 
not ideological but mathematical: More than seventy years ago, Tinbergen demonstrated that, 
with one, independent policy lever, a policy body can pursue, at most, one independent policy 
outcome.  The Fed has a single lever – the quantity of bank reserves; by the way, the fed funds 
rate, as an endogenously-determined market price, is not an instrument (it might be an 
indicator variable and an intermediate target variable as well).  With this single instrument, left 
to be determined are:  (a) what goal should be pursued and (b) what “strategy” or process is 
most likely to achieve the stated goal. 
 Congress, of course, has given the Fed a dual mandate for price stability and full 
employment, a mandate that is impossible on its face.  If Fed officials had behaved responsibly 
over the last decade, they might have used their political capital to lobby for relief from the 
latter (real) objective in the knowledge that, in the long run, monetary policy affects only 
nominal magnitudes.  Instead, as a flock of chattering parrots, Governors and bank presidents 
alike have embraced and preached their commitment to the Fed’s beloved dual mandate.  
Simultaneously, these same officials have lauded their commitment to, and achievement of, 
greater transparency in monetary policy.  This, of course, is nonsense:  Greater transparency 
cannot be achieved when an institution claims to be in pursuit in two conflicting goals.  The 
only mystery is whether Fed officials knowingly understand the problem they face or embrace it 
so willfully because of the political cover that goes hand-in-glove with the confusion.  When 
macroeconomists speak of “observational equivalence,” they rarely think of situations like this. 
 What should be clear, beyond the impossibility of achieving two conflicting goals with 
one instrument, is this:  When two conflicting goals are in play, the public never knows (a) 
which goal the Fed is pursuing at any particular moment in time (b) which goal has greater 
priority in the FOMC’s thinking and (c) if, or when, the FOMC might switch from pursuit of one 
goal to the other.  We need revisit only the last eighteen months and a casual reading of the 
financial press for abundant evidence of this confusion and the source of the confusion is the 
FOMC.  There is nothing transparent at all about what is going on.  Because the public is 
uncertain about at least the three bullet points above, the Fed is responsible for introducing a 
risk premium into markets rather than reducing uncertainty by creating a more informed 
public.  Yes, the Fed is more transparent now than in the past because it sets a specific 
numerical value for its intermediate target, the federal funds rate, rather than a range, and it 
announces the decision of FOMC meetings immediately rather than with a 45-day lag.  But 
how this is helpful remains a mystery when the public still is left to speculate about conflicts 
between the Fed’s two alternative goals; to say that confusion reigns is something easily 
verified by the full employment of “Fed watchers,” a profession that would be redundant if 
meaningful transparency were in place. 
 Genuine transparency and lower risk could be achieved if the Fed were given a mandate 
that made sense:  The single goal of price stability.  Unless macroeconomics really truly is in 
disarray, there’s no evidence that the Fed can forecast short run fluctuations with any 
reliability, that it can use monetary tools to smooth the cycle, or that a series of “optimal” short 
run actions to smooth output will be consistent with a desired long run objective for price 
stability.  And if no evidence is available to support that any of this is possible but both theory 
and evidence indicates that a central bank possesses the tools to achieve long run price 
stability if it sticks to that single objective, it seems sensible that this should be the central 
bank’s mandate.  With this change in legislation, genuinely harmful “mission creep” has been 
curtailed from the impossible to the doable.  The adoption of a single mandate also would 
follow the precedent set by the central banks of other major economies and of the European 
Community. 
Independence v. Accountability 
 With regard to the sensitive issue of “independence,” nothing that has been proposed in 
the foregoing threatens the Fed’s independence in a meaningful way.  Those who retreat to 
“independence” in every discussion of Fed reform rarely put the issue in context.  At the other 
end of the continuum is “accountability” and, taken literally, a perfectly independent central 
bank is unaccountable for its actions.  This is something that is unacceptable in a democracy.  
What has to be meant by “independence” is that, once the Fed is given its mandate, it is left 
free to pursue that mandate without undue interference.  In this sense, given the mandate to 
pursue a single objective for price stability, the Fed should be left to achieve that goal by 
targeting the funds rate, targeting money growth, manipulating the exchange rate or consulting 
a Ouija board.  That is the sense in which the Fed should be independent:  To operate free of 
political interference to accomplish its stated objective.   
But, what is missing from the Fed’s current structure and relationship with Congress is 
any real sense of accountability for its actions.  Other than subjecting the Chairman to re-
appointment every four years and requiring periodic testimony before various Congressional 
committees, there are no real penalties if the Fed fails to achieve its objectives.  In contrast, the 
heads of other central banks can be penalized by reductions in salaries or removal from office.  
Any reform of the Fed would benefit from less focus on independence and greater attention to 
accountability and ways that sanctions might be imposed when the Fed fails to achieve its new, 
single objective of price stability. 
Oversight 
 Some of the reform proposals have included recommendations for more oversight of Fed 
activities, including, for example, Congressman Paul’s suggestion that the GAO audit the Fed.  
While the merits of the GAO audit are not a topic of this Commentary, it is worth taking time to 
discuss that Congress has done a miserable job of exercising its current authority to monitor 
and discipline the Federal Reserve for obvious mis-steps in its conduct. 4  Already mentioned is 
the four-year period when someone was leaking FOMC decisions to the Wall St. Journal and, 
until the late Henry Gonzalez held hearings on Fed secrecy, no one seemed to care about these 
violations of the law.  And when Chairman Greenspan hi-jacked monetary policy for an 
extended period of time, no one inside the Fed and no one on any of the oversight committees 
saw fit to ask any questions about the puzzling pattern of FOMC votes and discount rate cuts.  
And when a GAO audit in the early 1990s found that the regional Federal Reserve Banks – 
private corporations – were calling themselves federal agencies and determined that this was 
just fine, nobody raised any eyebrow about this, either.  Proposing new authorities when 
existing oversight is being used ineffectually or not at all seems to be more about Congressional 
showmanship than good legislative practice. 
 One more log can be added to the fire on an issue that spans the Fed’s responsibilities 
as a statistical agency and affects the substance of monetary policy transparency and the Fed’s 
accountability to the public.  The Federal Reserve Act requires the Fed to maintain long run 
growth of the monetary and credit aggregates commensurate with the economy's long run 
potential to increase production, so as to promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, 
stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates.  Implicit in this (at least to me) is the 
creation and reporting of scientifically valid monetary statistics; if not, the Act’s requirement 
would seem to be a non-sequitur:  Produce a nonsensical number and then ensure that its 
growth is adequate for full employment, etc.   
If the foregoing logic is valid and the Federal Reserve Act requires the Fed to do what is 
described above, the Fed is not now and has not been in compliance with the Act, well, ever.  
To date, Congress has not revealed nor has it investigated this fundamental failure by the 
Federal Reserve as the statistical agency responsible for reporting basic monetary statistics.  
Worse, with the exception of one on-again, off-again effort at one of the regional Reserve Banks, 
the research departments and Bank Presidents have been essentially silent in calling attention 
to the fact that the Fed’s monetary statistics violate basic standards of scientific practice and, 
worse, knowingly fail to adopt modern standards that have been adopted for other series 
constructed by the Fed. 5  To be clear, the issue here is not one of whether M1 is “better” than 
M2 as old debates used to frame the question.  Instead, the point is that no measure of the 
money supply produced by the Fed is scientifically valid, the Fed knows the data are invalid, 
the Fed knows that state-of-the-art practices exist from which valid data could be created and 
the Fed knowingly refuses to adopt those practices.  And yet neither Congressional oversight 
nor internal dissent has led to a peep of inquiry. 
A reasonable person could be forgiven for wondering if the Fed didn’t continue its 
practice of constructing and reporting scientifically invalid money supply data because those 
data behave erratically and this erratic behavior gives the FOMC both a justification to conduct 
monetary policy with greater discretion and an excuse if its policy actions lead to unwelcome 
outcomes (i.e., mistakes).  After all, with one less informative data series that the public might 
monitor, monetary policy becomes less transparent and when the outcomes of monetary policy 
are less connected to the FOMC’s actions, the Fed becomes less accountable.  Within this 
context, the Fed has few incentives to produce monetary statistics that would make the public 
more informed about the thrust of monetary policy.  The scientific community also has been 
harmed because the continued reporting of these scientifically invalid data has taken an entire 
range of questions off the table.  Is interest rate targeting better than monetary targeting?  Is 
the behavior of the monetary aggregates informative for the course of future inflation?  The only 
honest answers to these, among a wide range of other questions, is “We don’t know,” because, 
lacking any meaningful data, questions like this cannot be investigated until the Federal 
Reserve decides that it will begin to act like the Bureau of Labor Statistics and other data 
agencies and produce honest, scientifically valid data.  On this score, it is fascinating that 
former Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan was asked to comment on several occasions about how 
the Consumer Price Index – one measure used to calculate the rate of inflation, an objective for 
which he was responsible – was calculated and, to everyone’s great surprise [sic], he concluded 
that it overstated the “true” rate of inflation.  Given this precedent, it would be nice to have 
statistical experts from other agencies comment on the quality of the Fed’s monetary data.  In 
any case, neither the existing oversight authorities granted to Congress nor voices within the 
Federal Reserve System have addressed a fundamental failure in the Federal Reserve’s 
responsibilities as a statistical agency and this has had regrettable implications for the course 
of public policy and scientific inquiry alike. 
Conclusion 
 The Federal Reserve System stands now largely unchanged from the structure it was 
given more than ninety-five years ago.  Recent proposals to reform the Fed have met opposition 
because they would threaten the institution’s independence and reduced independence is 
thought to impede the Fed’s ability to pursue its dual mandate for price stability and full 
employment. 
 The reforms suggested in this Commentary begin by recognizing that, on efficiency 
grounds alone, the size of the Federal Reserve System should be reduced:  The volume of price 
services activity already has led to closing a number of branch offices and limiting the Fed’s 
supervisory function to the largest one hundred bank holding companies would argue for the 
elimination of many main offices as well.  Also in favor of reducing the number of main offices 
is the argument that, with permanent voting status, the smaller number of remaining 
presidents would have more incentive to be engaged in the monetary policy process than as 
occasional voters who are lost in a larger group.  The creation of incentives to recruit and retain 
more permanent members of the Board of Governors also was proposed. 
 In proposing reforms, care was taken to define concepts of “independence” and 
“transparency” carefully.  Although these terms are used frequently in most discussions of 
Federal Reserve operations and structure, their common uses are imprecise and often 
meaningless when applied to practical operations of the central bank.  The Fed should be 
independent in the sense that it is free to choose the method in which it pursues the objective 
it is tasked to achieve but not independent from all accountability for its actions.  Moreover, 
while the Fed has taken credit for being more transparent because it now sets an explicit target 
for the funds rate and releases more information about its deliberations than in the past, its 
pursuit of a dual mandate is responsible for introducing considerable confusion into public 
perceptions about what specific goal the Fed is pursuing with its single instrument and when 
the FOMC might switch its focus to pursuit of another, conflicting goal.  Any reform of the Fed 
should place a high priority on resolving this conflict and establishing a single objective for the 
Fed’s operations.  Because economic theory, empirical evidence and the practice of other major 
central banks all point in the same direction, it was recommended that Congress adopt 
legislation that would give the Fed a single goal of achieving price stability.  Finally, rather than 
introducing new tools for Congress to use in employing oversight of Federal Reserve activities, 
Congress was advised to begin by using the oversight tools currently at its disposal more 
effectively. 
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ENDNOTES 
                                                   
1
 Between March 1989 and May 1993, eleven of thirty-four policy decisions of the FOMC were 
reported in the Wall Street Journal within a few days of the Fed’s meetings.  At the time, it was 
Fed policy to announce its decisions with a forty-five day lag and leaking this information to 
the press was a violation of federal law.  Despite the persistence of the leaks, however, virtually 
nothing was done to investigate or stop the practice until the fall of 1993 when the late 
Congressman Henry Gonzales (Dem./Tx) held hearings on the topic of Federal Reserve 
“secrecy.”  One result of those hearings was a switch in Federal Reserve practice:  FOMC 
decisions have been announced immediately after meetings adjourned since February 1994.  
See Belongia and Kliesen (1994). 
2
 To cite but one example, when Blinder served as Vice Chairman of the Fed, he asked if he 
could attend meetings of the research staff to watch their preparation of the “Greenbook” 
forecast, the Fed’s official forecast prepared before each FOMC meeting.  The staff denied him 
permission to attend these meetings.  Blinder’s account of this episode and other dealings with 
Fed staff are recounted in…………….While preparing this article for final draft, I read an essay 
written by Blinder shortly after he left the Board of Governors and noticed he chose the word 
“byzantine” to describe the Fed’s governance structure;  see Blinder (1996, p. 3). 
3 ACORN is an acronym for “Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now,” a 
collection of community action groups which, according to its website, pursues (among other 
objectives), a higher minimum wage, the elimination of predatory financial practices and the 
development of affordable housing and community benefits agreements. 
4
 For the record, based on the output of a previous GAO audit of the Fed in the 1990s, I am 
skeptical that the process would produce anything meaningful. 
5
 The money supply data reported by the Federal Reserve are called “simple sum” data because 
they are arithmetic –unweighted -- sums of the amounts in various deposit categories.  Barnett 
                                                                                                                                                                    
(see Barnett (1980) and, for a less technical survey, Barnett (1982)) derived results for weighted 
money supply statistics that were based in the optimizing behavior of individuals and 
demonstrated that the Fed’s methodology for data construction was irredeemably flawed.  
Moreover, as shown in Belongia (1996) empirical work is sensitive to measurement, with 
qualitative inferences being reversed when studies using simple sum monetary data were 
replicated using Divisia measures of the money supply.  That the Fed is aware of the 
measurement problem is well-known:  It revised its own Index of Industrial Production with a 
Fisher-Ideal Index, another member of the superlative class of index numbers, as is the Divisia 
Index.  Work on Divisia indexes at the St. Louis Fed, which have not been updated since 2005, 
is described in Anderson, Jones and Nesmith (1997) and two more technical articles in the 
same issue of the St. Louis Fed Review. 
 
